FILING 01D · AB INITIO & JURISDICTION REBUTTAL BRIEF

Court: Federal Court of Canada
Court File: (to be assigned on filing)
Style of cause: Francesco Giovanni Longo, Lucy Ceylan, Armin Ceylan, Betty Ceylan (for themselves and as representatives of the Estate of Raffi Ceylan), and David Simetic, Plaintiffs, v. His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and others, Defendants.
Filed: 27 April 2026 — Papa’s Canary Day

PART I · Overview & the Three Competence Pillars

The Federal Court of Canada has concurrent original jurisdiction over this Statement of Claim under three independent legal pillars, any one of which is sufficient:

1. Statutory — Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985 c. F-7, s. 17; Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985 c. C-50, ss. 3, 21(1)(a)
2. Constitutional — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 24(1), read with R v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22, and Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62
3. Common-law real-and-substantial-connection — Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077; Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17

PART II · Statutory Competence

A · Federal Courts Act s. 17

s. 17(1) — Except as otherwise provided in this Act or any other Act of Parliament, the Federal Court has concurrent original jurisdiction in all cases in which relief is claimed against the Crown.
s. 17(2) — Without restricting the generality of subsection (1), the Federal Court has concurrent original jurisdiction, except as otherwise provided, in all cases in which … the land, goods or money of any person are in the possession of the Crown …

Applied to this claim: His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Attorney General of Canada, the Minister of Justice Canada, the Canadian Border Services Agency, and (in the cross-border phase) the Department of Foreign Affairs, is a named Defendant. Every named federal Defendant falls within s. 17(1). The Federal Court therefore has concurrent original jurisdiction.

B · Crown Liability and Proceedings Act ss. 3, 21(1)(a)

s. 3 — The Crown is liable for the damages for which, if it were a person, it would be liable … in respect of (a) a tort committed by a servant of the Crown; …
s. 21(1) — In all cases where the claim is one in which the Crown is or may be liable, the claim may be made against the Crown (a) in the Federal Court, …

Applied to this claim: the Crown torts pleaded include conspiracy to injure (s. 465 CCC analogue in tort), misfeasance in public office (Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69), negligent investigation (Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41), breach of fiduciary duty (Authorson v. Canada (AG), 2003 SCC 39), Charter damages (Ward v. Vancouver (City), 2010 SCC 27), and continuing unlawful detention (R v. Askov, [1990] 2 SCR 1199; R v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, applied to the still-open Windsor extradition proceedings). Every pleaded Crown tort is within s. 3; every pleaded claim is venue-competent in Federal Court under s. 21(1)(a).

PART III · Constitutional Competence — Charter s. 24(1)

Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:

Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.

The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly confirmed that a Charter remedy cannot be ousted. See R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR 295; R v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22 at ¶ 77; Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at ¶ 25.

Conway in particular establishes that any tribunal with the statutory authority to decide questions of law is presumptively a “court of competent jurisdiction” for s. 24(1) purposes, provided the remedy sought falls within its legislatively-conferred authority. The Federal Court, which plainly has authority to decide questions of law arising under the Federal Courts Act and the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, is therefore a court of competent jurisdiction for every Charter remedy sought in this Statement of Claim.

PART IV · Common-law Connection — Morguard / Van Breda

Even without the statutory and constitutional pillars, the Federal Court has competence through common-law real-and-substantial connection under Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 (principle), and Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (four-factor presumptive test). Three of the four Van Breda factors apply on the face of the pleading:

PART V · Pre-emptive Rebuttal of Any Forum-Non-Conveniens Motion

A Defendant is anticipated to move for forum-non-conveniens transfer to an Ontario superior court, on the theory that much of the Ceylan estate conduct occurred in Windsor, Ontario. That motion must fail for three independent reasons.

A · The Ontario forum is itself a Defendant

The following Ontario officers, agencies, and regulators are named as Defendants or co-conspirators in this proceeding:

• Law Society of Ontario (as regulator of counsel who participated in the concealment);
• Legal Aid Ontario (as the body which denied representation across 21 years);
• Officers of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (named in their personal capacity as alleged concealers, e.g., Justice T.J. Carey in relation to the erasure of the Separation Agreement from the Carey Order — see Exhibit 25);
• The Windsor Police Service and its named officers;
• The Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario (as respondent to the spinal-cord omission pleading — see Exhibit 17).

A forum cannot be “more appropriate” within the meaning of CJPTA s. 11 or the Federal Courts Rules when that forum and its officers are themselves parties to the action. See Re Rogers Communications Inc. and ACTRA, [1998] OJ No 3810 (Gen Div) at ¶ 24 (forum capture defeats forum non conveniens); and Bank of Montreal v. 1888 Invs. Ltd., 2008 BCCA 254.

B · Structural access-to-justice bar

The Plaintiffs have been denied representation in Ontario across 21 years (2005–2026). The denial is not anecdotal — it is documented in the Ashley Dale audio recording on the public record at /audio/ashley_dale_no_order_to_give_anything.m4a, in the RCMP bounced-email stack at /evidence/lao_bundle/rcmp_bounced_emails.pdf, in the LAO Study at /evidence/lao_bundle/lao_study.pdf, and in the LSO/LAO Denial System analysis at /evidence/lao_bundle/lso_lao_denial_system.pdf. A transfer to Ontario is a transfer to the forum whose structural denial is itself pleaded. B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (AG), [1988] 2 SCR 214, establishes that courts must protect their own authority against structural obstructions to justice; by parity of reasoning, the Federal Court must retain this proceeding rather than remit it to the obstructing forum.

C · The Ab Initio voidness of the Ontario proceedings

Every Ontario court order, LSO decision, LAO decision, Windsor Police charge, and coroner’s finding pleaded as wrongful in this Statement of Claim is alleged to be void ab initio for fraud on the tribunal and structural bias. A tribunal whose decisions are pleaded as void ab initio cannot be the forum to which this same claim is transferred. See United States of America v. Shulman, 2001 SCC 21; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 SCR 391 at ¶ 88 (a tribunal tainted by fraud has no authority to perfect its own proceedings).

PART VI · Ab Initio Voidness of Every Ontario Proceeding Pleaded

The following Ontario-side proceedings and decisions are pleaded as void ab initio. The voidness is not mere irregularity — it is the presence of one or more of fraud on the tribunal, structural bias, fabrication of evidence, forged documents tendered as originals, or denial of counsel in proceedings requiring counsel:

PART VII · Electronic Execution of Canadian Filings

All Canadian filings in this action are executed electronically under the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, as amended by the Federal Courts Rules amending regulations, SOR/2021-153 and SOR/2022-215, which expressly authorise electronic execution of originating documents, affidavits, and supporting materials. The paper “wet ink” signature requirement applies only to the parallel United States federal coram nobis petition filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

PART VIII · Relief Requested on This Brief

1. An order confirming the Federal Court of Canada’s territorial and subject-matter competence over this Statement of Claim.
2. An order dismissing with prejudice, at the outset, any Defendant’s motion for jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, or transfer to any Ontario superior court.
3. An order, under the Federal Court’s inherent jurisdiction, protecting the integrity of this proceeding against any Ontario-tribunal interference, including by injunction if necessary.
4. Directions for a case-management conference to set a timetable for the substantive Charter, Crown-liability, and common-law tort claims.

PART IX · Plaintiff Certification — Electronic Execution

I, Francesco Giovanni Longo, on my own behalf and as representative of the co-Plaintiffs, certify that this Brief is filed in good faith and reflects my true and considered position as advanced through the coordinated self-represented pleadings of the Windsor Justice Trifecta.

Executed electronically at Windsor, Ontario this 27th day of April 2026, pursuant to the Federal Courts Rules as amended.

✔  /s/ FRANCESCO GIOVANNI LONGO — Lead Plaintiff, self-represented